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 Commentary
Conceptualising the right to data
protection in an era of Big Data
Yvonne McDermott
Abstract
In 2009, with the enactment of the Lisbon Treaty, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union entered into
force. Under Article 8 of the Charter, for the first time, a stand-alone fundamental right to data protection was declared.
The creation of this right, standing as a distinct right to the right to privacy, is undoubtedly significant, and it is unique to
the European legal order, being absent from other international human rights instruments. This commentary examines
the parameters of this new right to data protection, asking what are the principles underpinning the right. It argues that
the right reflects some key values inherent in the European legal order, namely: privacy, transparency, autonomy and
nondiscrimination. It also analyses some of the challenges in implementing this right in an era of ubiquitous veillance
practices and Big Data.
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In 2009, with the enactment of the Lisbon Treaty, the
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
entered into force. Under Article 8 of the Charter, for
the ﬁrst time, a stand-alone fundamental right to data
protection was declared. The creation of this right,
standing as a distinct right to the right to privacy, is
undoubtedly signiﬁcant, and it is unique to the
European legal order, being absent from other inter-
national human rights instruments, such as the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
However, the European Union ‘has neither adequately
justiﬁed the introduction of the right to data protection
in the EU legal order nor explained its content.’
(Lynskey, 2014: 572).
This commentary examines the parameters of this
new right to data protection, asking what the values
underpinning the right are. This piece also analyses
some of the challenges in implementing this right in
an era of ubiquitous ‘dataveillance’, or the systematic
monitoring of citizen’s communications or actions
through the use of information technology (Clarke,
1988), and ‘Big Data’, or the collection of large data-
sets, which are capable of being searched, aggregated,
and cross-referenced (Boyd and Crawford, 2012: 663).
Developing a fundamental right to
data protection
The Data Protection Directive of 1995 made no men-
tion to a human right to data protection. As Van der
Sloot has argued, the original rules in the Data
Protection Directive and related rules ‘could best be
regarded as principles of good governance’, as they
were not framed as relating to the human rights of
the data subject, but rather focussed on the procedural
obligations of controllers (Van der Sloot, 2014).
By contrast, the Global Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR) is expressly framed in terms of rights, with
Article 1 noting that the Regulation ‘protects funda-
mental rights and freedoms of natural persons and in
particular their right to the protection of personal
data.’ Given that a right to privacy was well-established
in the European legal order for many years before the
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drafting of the Charter, one might wonder what add-
itional value or need was perceived to attach to a stand-
alone right to data protection, especially given that the
European Court of Human Rights had, in a number of
cases, included data protection rights, including the
principle that data should only be used for the limited
purpose for which it was gathered, within the ambit of
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human
Rights on the right to privacy (Peck, 2003). Yet,
while the right to data protection is closely related to
the right to privacy, as well as the rights to freedom of
thought, conscience and religion; freedom of expres-
sion; an eﬀective remedy, and a fair trial, it has some
distinct elements that justify its framing as a stand-
alone right. These elements are: that data should be
processed fairly, for speciﬁc purposes, and only on
the basis of the consent of the person concerned or
some other legitimate basis set down in law; the right
of access and rectiﬁcation of data collected, and control
by an independent authority (Article 8, Charter of
Fundamental Rights).
This new construction eﬀectively elevates established
principles of data protection to obligations incumbent
on data processers in order to respect the rights of data
subjects. In a Habermassian sense, this adds some nor-
mative force to the rights holder’s claim, insofar as indi-
viduals’ status is enhanced when they demand
compliance with rights, as opposed to some moral obli-
gation (Habermas, 2010: 349). Indeed, the framing of
data protection as a right appears to have imposed
much greater obligations on private actors than most
other human rights – it is diﬃcult, for example, to think
of another human right that product designers must
take into account when developing new products, as
is required under the GDPR.
Therefore, the creation of data protection as a dis-
tinct right is both normatively and practically signiﬁ-
cant. The reasons for the creation of this right are
somewhat unclear, however, and the explanations relat-
ing to the Charter provide little illustration in this
regard. It could be said to have been a reﬂection of
an increasing recognition of the right in domestic law
across Europe – the German Constitutional Court had
developed the notion of ‘informational self-determina-
tion’, stemming from the constitutional principle of dig-
nity, whilst, in France, the courts had begun to apply
data protection rights as a component of the right to
liberty (De Hert and Gutwirth, 2009). Yet, this emer-
gence of the right was far from universal across
European legal systems, and was couched in rather dif-
ferent terms, being linked to distinct constitutional con-
cepts in those states that had developed the right.
Another theory suggests that the purpose behind the
development of the right to data protection in the
Charter was to apply the principles of good data
processing to those European Union activities that
fell outside the Data Protection Directive’s remit,
namely police and security co-operation (Article 29
Working Party, 2009; Cannataci and Mifsud-Bonnici,
2005). That argument, while attractive, is not supported
by the GDPR, which expressly excludes national secur-
ity activities and the processing of personal data in rela-
tion to the Union’s common foreign and security policy
from the scope of the Regulation’s application. I argue
below that the creation of the right could be traced to a
number of distinct values inherent in the pre-existing
data protection framework – namely privacy, auton-
omy, transparency and non-discrimination – that were
perhaps seen as not being fully protected in the pre-
Charter fundamental rights framework, and that by
placing data protection on an equal footing with exist-
ing rights, those values were sought to be protected.
Aside from the uncertain legislative basis for its
incorporation, the nature of the right to data protection
has sometimes been criticized as being necessarily of a
procedural nature, insofar as it ‘does not directly rep-
resent any value or interest per se; it prescribes the pro-
cedures and methods for pursuing the respect of values
embodied in other rights’ (de Andrade, 2012).
Determann, for example, is critical of the Schrems judg-
ment in pointing out that the claimant ‘could hardly
show any plausible harm or need of protection’
(Determann, 2016: 246). This arguably misses the
point of fundamental rights protection; the recognition
of rights as fundamental reﬂect the norms underpinning
a legal order (Palombella, 2007), and ‘plausible’ harm
(whatever that might mean) need not be shown for a
violation to be proven. This is illustrated by the exten-
sive jurisprudence on the right to a fair trial, for exam-
ple, where a violation can be found even where the
failure to respect a component of the right to a fair
trial (such as the right to examine witnesses, or access
to a lawyer) has had no discernible impact on the out-
come of the trial (Trechsel, 2005). Rights are recognised
as such because they protect particular values of a
polity, and whilst rights violations often result in ser-
ious harm to claimants, this is not a necessary compo-
nent of a claim because a breach of those rights is an
attack on the values underpinning the legal system, and
that is the harm that human rights jurisprudence seeks
to protect against. It is therefore apposite to examine
what values underpin the right to data protection.
Values underpinning data protection as
a fundamental right
Privacy
It is clear that privacy, itself a fundamental right, is a
value that the right to data protection seeks to protect.
2 Big Data & Society
There are diﬀerent formulations of what the right to
privacy entails, spanning from the rather limited idea
of privacy only attaching to those intimate matters to
which a ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ might
attach (Campbell, 2004), to a wider notion of ‘the
right to be left alone’ (Von Hannover, 2004), to an
even broader, more recent, idea that the right to privacy
is closely related to the protection of one’s identity
(Hildebrandt, 2006). Data protection clearly ﬁts closest
within this third sphere – while some data (such as
medical information) might be of the sort to which a
reasonable expectation of privacy attaches, other data
(e.g. identifying data such as one’s address and phone
number) falls outside of that scope. Equally, the idea of
the right to be left alone presupposes some intrusion
into one’s day-to-day life, yet the Snowden leaks
showed that a great deal of surveillance happens in
the background, unbeknownst to those whose data is
being collected for those purposes (Lyon, 2014).
Autonomy
Another important value that the right to data protec-
tion protects is the autonomy of the individual – this is
clear from the continued centrality of consent to the
European data protection regime. Recital 7 of the
GDPR notes that ‘[n]atural persons should have con-
trol of their own personal data.’ The principle of auton-
omy and the related focus on consent is also clearly
linked to the concept of dignity. When German
courts developed the notion of ‘informational self-
determination’, it was conceived as related to the con-
stitutional right to dignity (1 BvR 209, 1983). The focus
on consent in the right to data protection ﬁts closest
with the so-called ‘will theory’ of rights. The will theory
sees the function of rights as being the granting of con-
trol to rights holders to subject others to a duty to
respect those rights (Hart, 1955). The rights to remedies
outlined in Chapter VIII of the GDPR enhance that
view, insofar as they bolster that control (Lynskey,
2014).
Yet, the fact that a large degree of consent in this
realm is uninformed has been well-documented
(McStay, 2013), and some have questioned whether it
is desirable to leave it to the individual data subject to
improve the level of data protection (Matzner et al.,
2016). As the European Commission’s Impact
Assessment noted, ‘individuals are often neither aware
nor in control of what happens to their personal data
and therefore fail to exercise their rights eﬀectively’
(European Commission, 2012). To this end, the
GDPR marries the emphasis on autonomy and consent
with a parallel focus on the duties of data controllers,
regardless of whether data subjects have taken positive
steps to enforce those duties (Quelle, 2011). This aspect
ﬁts most closely with the ‘interest theory’ of rights,
which sees the function of human rights as imposing
a positive duty on actors to respect the interests of
others, irrespective of whether the rights-holder claims
that duty (Raz, 1984). Indeed, some have argued that
the focus on data controllers in the GDPR is inherently
paternalistic, insofar as it requires an assumption of the
will of the rights holder that has not been expressly
articulated (Quelle, 2011). However, given the degree
to which research has shown people to be oblivious to
the terms and conditions that they willingly sign up to,
it would seem that placing some of those obligations on
services to protect the data of individual users is both
proportionate and necessary.
Transparency
Many authors have commented on the power asymme-
tries inherent in the area of data protection (Lynskey,
2014), given the issues surrounding consent and know-
ledge, as mentioned above. The GDPR attempts to
address this fact, by deﬁning ‘consent’ as ‘any freely
given, speciﬁc, informed and unambiguous indication
of the data subject’s wishes by which he or she, by a
statement or by a clear aﬃrmative action, signiﬁes
agreement to the processing of personal data relating
to him or her’ (Article 4(11), GDPR). Pursuant to
Article 7, any request for consent should be intelligible,
accessible and in clear and plain language; Recital 58 of
the GDPR explicitly links this requirement to ‘the prin-
ciple of transparency’. This formulation is ‘informa-
tion-forcing’ and addresses the imbalance of power,
insofar as it ‘force[s] the disclosure of information
about data transfer and use’ (Schwartz, 2004: 2100).
It is for this reason that De Hert and Gutwirth have
argued that, while the right to privacy could be deﬁned
as a ‘tool of opacity’ that sets limits for the normative
exercise of power, the right to data protection is a ‘tool
of transparency’, which channels the exercise of that
normatively accepted power (De Hert and Gutwirth,
2006).
Non-discrimination
Related to the principle of transparency underpinning
the GDPR is a recognition that the collection and pro-
cessing of data should be carried out in a manner that
prevents discriminatory eﬀects on persons ‘on the basis
of racial or ethnic origin, political opinion, religion or
beliefs, trade union membership, genetic or health
status or sexual orientation’ (Recital 71, GDPR). To
that end, the GDPR establishes a right not to be subject
to a decision solely based on automated processing,
including proﬁling, deﬁned as the use of personal data
to analyze or predict certain aspects of a person,
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including their health, behaviour, movements and per-
sonal preferences (Article 9, GDPR). Further, the pro-
cessing of personal, biometric or genetic data for the
purposes of identifying an individual or revealing any
their protected characteristics (Article 22, GDPR) is
expressly prohibited, subject to a number of exceptions.
These prohibitions recognize that such processing
can have an inherently discriminatory eﬀect, and dis-
crimination is one of the potential harms listed in
Recital 75 of the GDPR. It could be argued that the
right to data protection protects one’s ‘future life’, inso-
far as the collection of data may not cause any harm at
the time of its collection, but the potential that this data
can be processed at a later date to proﬁle or make
assessments about the person or group of persons in
question. The knowledge that data can be collected in
bulk and stored for future processing may have a ‘chil-
ling eﬀect’ on society (Intelligence and Security
Committee of Parliament, 2015).
The right to data protection and in an
era of Big Data
The contemporary context of ubiquitous veillance prac-
tices and the increased focus on the collection and pro-
cessing of Big Data poses some unique challenges to the
right to data protection. Before turning to two speciﬁc
challenges, it is important to clarify the meaning of
both ‘veillance’ and ‘Big Data’. Mann has distinguished
between three types of veillance – the classic ‘surveil-
lance’, when a person is being watched from above,
‘sousveillance’, when the person themselves is doing
the watching, and co-veillance (or mutual watching)
(Mann, 2016: 2). Owing to advances in technology,
‘(a) there is virtually no limit to the amount of infor-
mation that can be recorded, (b) there is virtually no
limit to the scope of analysis that can be done –
bounded only by human ingenuity, and (c) the infor-
mation may be stored virtually forever’ (Rouvroy and
Poullet, 2009). Bakir has referred to the new phenom-
enon of ‘veillant panoptic assemblage’, where data
gathered through the ordinary citizen’s veillance prac-
tices ﬁnds its way to state surveillance mechanisms,
through the corporations that hold that data (Bakir,
2015). Big Data is a notoriously diﬃcult concept to
ﬁnd a commonly accepted deﬁnition for (Ward and
Barker, 2013), but a number of key features of Big
Data have been identiﬁed, including: the huge volume
of data, the speed at which it is collected, the variety of
data, its relational nature (allowing linkages to be made
to other data sets), and potentially exhaustive scope
(Kitchin, 2013: 262).
The ﬁrst challenge to protecting the right to data
protection today is the ubiquity of ‘volunteered’ data,
particularly through the rise in wearable devices and
social media networks, although the users of such
devices may not think of themselves as volunteering
data to others (Lyon, 2014). The rise in the so-called
‘quantiﬁed self’, or the self-tracking of biological, envir-
onmental, physical, or behavioural information
through tracking devices, Internet-of-things devices,
social network data and other means (Swan, 2013)
may result in information being gathered not just
about the individual user, but about people around
them as well. Thus, a solely consent-based model does
not entirely ensure the protection of one’s data, espe-
cially when data collected for one purpose can be re-
purposed for another.
Secondly, as revealed by the Snowden leaks, mass
surveillance is seen as a means to prevent future
crimes, such as terrorist attacks and cyber-attacks,
and the ‘watchers’ are less visible than in the past,
given that a great deal of their surveillance is by
means of ‘dataveillance’, or surveilling online and com-
munications data rather than physical movements.
(Graham and Marvin, 2001; Richards and King,
2013) According to Waldron, any ‘theory of rights
will face diﬃculties about the interests it identiﬁes as
rights, and the terms in which it identiﬁes them. Those
disagreements will in turn be vehicles for controversies
about the proper balance to be struck between some
individual interest and some countervailing social con-
siderations’ (Waldron, 1993: 30). The correct balance to
be struck between the interests protected by the right to
data protection, as outlined above, and whether the
curtailment of some aspects of that right constitutes
as necessary and proportionate measure to protect
national security will continue to be a subject of
debate for many years to come.
In addition, the right to data protection comes into
conﬂict with the interest of international co-operation
in security matters and, more generally, companies’
desire to allow the free transfer of data from its oper-
ations in an EU state to one of its operations in a third
country. Much focus in the literature on transfer of
data has been on the adequacy of protection with
data transfers to the United States of America, which
is unsurprising given the focus on the adequacy of the
Safe Harbour Agreement in the Schrems decision
(Schrems, 2015), and analysis of its successor, the EU-
US Privacy Shield (see, e.g. Article 29 Working Party,
2016). However, the European Commission has also
decided that data can be transferred to states that are
not particularly renowned for their data protection
regimes, including Argentina, Israel, Uruguay and
New Zealand (European Commission, 2016), having
deemed that those states oﬀer an adequate level of pro-
tection of data (Determann, 2016). As regards the
Privacy Shield, it remains to be seen how the results
of the 2016 Presidential election in the United States
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will impact upon the perceived suﬃciency of data pro-
tection there. Hufbauer and Jung (2016) noted that the
real test for US data protection would be the impact of
the Trans-Paciﬁc Partnership trade agreement, which
had as one of its aims the free ﬂow of data and an
end to so-called ‘data localization’ (p. 2), but the
President Elect has already signalled his opposition to
the Trans-Paciﬁc Partnership Agreement (TPP), which
has not yet been ratiﬁed by the USA (Yuhas, 2016).
From an EU point of view, there is reason to believe
that surveillance activities will be even more enhanced
and possibly more overt under the new President than
his predecessor (Glaser, 2016); whether Privacy Shield
will continue to satisfy citizens, companies, govern-
ments and intergovernmental organizations in this
new political climate remains far from certain.
Lastly, a word of caution should be sounded on the
increasing trend towards using algorithms to predict
future crimes (de Goede, 2014). This form of ‘social
sorting’ (Lyon, 2002) has the inherent danger of perpe-
tuating discrimination and assumptions about certain
strands of populations. The accuracy these Big Data
methods to accurately predict potential future events
might be called into question. We can point to a
number of examples, including Google’s unsuccessful
attempts at health diagnostics (Lazer et al., 2014)
and, most recently, the use of analytics to predict the
US election results (Carter, 2016), to question the util-
ity of Big Data to predict future events. This trend risks
limiting individuals’ human rights and freedoms, inso-
far as people self-regulate, being aware of ‘a state of
conscious and permanent visibility’, in the sense of
Foucault’s Panopticism (Foucault, 1977: 201).
Moreover, the use of Big Data as a proﬁling tool can
have the impact of creating ‘the very scenarios it seeks
to prevent’ (Carlson, 2016: 53) by turning an innocent
citizen into a terrorist suspect through the collation and
interpretation of pieces of their data; data, in this sense,
becomes ‘performative’ (Raley, 2013: 128).
Conclusion
This piece examined the principles underpinning the
human right to data protection and argued that this
unique and newly created right reﬂects some key values
inherent in the European legal order, namely privacy,
transparency, autonomy and non-discrimination. The
contemporary context of enhanced veillance (both by
the state and fellow citizens), the repurposing of data,
the globalization and international cooperation in data
processing and collection, and the increased use of algo-
rithms to predict future risks undoubtedly present chal-
lenges for the realization of the right to data protection.
In a changing global order, there is a greater need than
ever before to reﬂect on the importance of the principles
underpinning that right to our society, and to strengthen
the realization of the right to data protection as a funda-
mental human right owed to all individuals.
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